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PHYSICALISM AND CLASSICAL THEISM 
Peter Forrest 
In this paper I compare two versions of non-eliminative physicalism 
(reductive physicalism and supervenience physicalism) with four of the five 
theses of classical theism: divine non-contingency, divine transcendence, 
divine simplicity, and the aseity thesis. I argue that: 
1. Both physicalism (either version) and classical theism require intuition-
transcending identifications of some properties or possibilities. 
2. Among other identifications, both reductive physicalism and classical 
theism need to identify psychological with functional properties. 
3. Both reductive physicalism and classical theism have a problem with 
consciousness. 
4. Both reductive physicalists and classical theists should distinguish fine 
and coarse grained theories of properties. 
Introduction 
In this paper I compare non-eliminative physicalism with classical 
theism, noting especially the ways in which they rely on similar theses 
in analytic ontology and in philosophical psychology. Presumably there 
is a moral in this: those who live in glass houses should not throw 
stones. 
I shall be comparing two versions of non-eliminative physicalism, 
namely reductive physicalism and supervenience physicalism, with four 
of the five theses of classical theism, namely divine non-contingency, 
divine transcendence, divine simplicity, and the aseity thesis. I shall 
have nothing much to say about a fifth thesis, divine eternity, even 
though it is the temporal analog of simplicity.! Moreover I shall refrain 
from strengthening the aseity thesis to what Plantinga has called the 
sovereignty-aseity intuition.2 As I understand it, the aseity thesis says 
that (i) God is a se, that is not dependent for existence on anything else, 
and (ii) everything else depends for its existence on God. 3 
In order to give this comparison some structure I shall argue for the 
following four theses: 
Thesis One (intuition-transcendence): 
Part (i): Both versions of non-eliminative physicalism require intu-
ition-transcending, but not counter-intuitive, identifications of 
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some properties or possibilities.' 
Part (ii): Similarly, divine non-contingency, divine simplicity, and 
perhaps divine transcendence require intuition-transcending, but 
not counter-intuitive, identifications. 
Thesis Two (the reliance on functionalism): Both reductive physical-
ists and classical theists have reason to identify psychological with 
functional properties. 
Thesis Three (the shared problem of consciousness): Both classical 
theists and reductive physicalists have a problem with conscious-
ness. 
Thesis Four (the reliance on the coarse/fine distinction): One solution 
to the problem of consciousness is to distinguish fine and coarse 
grained theories of properties. The combination of finer and coarser 
grained theories also enables us to resolve a tension between divine 
simplicity and the aseity thesis. 
1. Theories of possibility and of properties 
To make my comparison between physicalism and classical theism I 
require the appropriate context, namely theories of possibility and of 
properties. Let us begin with possibility. I shall be considering the 
modality of the metaphysically possible, to be distinguished from mere 
logical consistency on the one hand, and from nomological and time-. 
dependent possibility, on the other. 
Those who think about metaphysical possibility find themselves with 
various intuitions, only sometimes in agreement with those of other 
metaphysicians. Here are some examples: 
The Necessity of Mathematics: 
All mathematical and logical truths, including those of set theory 
and mereology, are necessary. 
The Necessity of Identity: 
True identity statements in which the referring expressions function 
like proper names (eg that Hesperus is Phosphorus) are necessary.s 
The Possibility of Actuality: 
Whatever is true is possibly true. 
An intuition which I shall seek to modify, but which might be fairly 
widespread is: 
The Contingency of Existence: 
If something exists it is not merely logically consistent that it never 
have existed but metaphysically possible. 
By an intuition-bound theory of (metaphysical) possibility I mean one 
which makes no assertions about possibility other than those for which 
there is intuitive support. By an intuition-transcending theory I mean one 
which does make further assertions. The point around which this whole 
paper revolves is that intuition transcendence is not the same as being 
counter-intuitive, even though we are constantly tempted to confuse the 
two when it comes to metaphysical disputes. And I exhibit both physi-
calism and classical theism as intuition-transcending but not counter-
intuitive. 
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An example of intuition transcendence which is directly relevant to 
the present topic concerns Guleserian's intriguing modal argument from 
evil.6 Guleserian argues that there are possible worlds so evil that it is 
impossible that they are created by a God who is necessarily good. Let 
us call these metaphysical Gulags. This conflicts with the traditional the-
istic claims that (i) not merely does no contingent thing exist uncreated 
but that it is metaphysically impossible for any created thing to have 
existed uncreated and (ii) not merely is God in fact good, it is necessarily 
the case that God is good. The response of theists has typically been to 
deny the possibility of metaphysical Gulags.? But there is nothing in our 
modal intuitions which excludes them. Instead theists are insisting that 
it is initially an open question whether the metaphysical Gulags are pos-
sible and that they are entitled to assume that they are impossible in 
order to defend theism. So, I submit, the rejection of metaphysical 
Gulags is an intuition-transcending theory, and Guleserian's argument 
derives its appeal from our tendency to assimilate the intuition-tran-
scending to the counter-intuitive. 
Just as we have intuitions about possibilities we have ones about 
properties. Here is a firm one. 
Necessity of Co-extension: 
If it is metaphysically possible that something has F but not G, then 
being F is not identical to being G. 
More controversial are the following, starting with the converse of the 
Necessity of Co-extension: 
Sufficiency of Co-extension: 
If being F is not identical to being G then it is either metaphysically 
possible that something has F but not G or metaphysically possible 
that something has G but not F. 
Conjunction Principle: 
If being F and being G are properties and if there is something 
which is both F and G then there is a conjunctive property: being F 
and G.8 
Functional Property Principle: 
If being G is a property of properties then having-some-property-
which-has-G is itself a property. 
Instantiation Condition: 
There are no uninstantiated properties. 
Resemblance Principle: 
If things resemble each other to some extent because they are all Fs 
then they resemble each other because of shared properties.' 
More controversial still are the Disjunction and Negation Principles: 
Disjunction Principle: 
If F and G are both properties then there is a property of being F 
and/or G. 
Negation Principle: 
If being F is property and there is something which is not F, then 
there is a property of not being F. 
Many principles such as the Instantiation Condition could be treated 
as stipulations rather than intuitions. That is, we simply restrict our 
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attention to instantiated properties. Less drastically we might combine 
an intuition-transcending ambiguity thesis with a stipulative disam-
biguation. For instance we might transcend our property-theoretic intu-
itions by postulating that there are two kinds of entity both of which 
could be called properties. For one kind, perhaps, but not the other the 
disjunction and negation principles hold. Given that intuition-transcend-
ing ambiguity thesis, we could then stipulate that by properties we 
mean, say, the first kind of entity. 
Theories of properties may differ, then, in various ways depending on 
(i) the metaphysical intuitions (ii) any intuition-transcending or even 
counter-intuitive postulates and (iii) any stipulations made. I shall now 
give an important example of these differences, namely the distinction 
between coarse and fine grained theories of properties. lo Let us say that 
being F metaphysically entails being G if it is metaphysically impossible 
for there to be an F which is not a G. This enables us to characterise the 
two grades: 
(i) The fine grade theory of properties, in which pairs of mutually 
metaphysically entailing properties are allowed. 
(ii) The coarse grade theory of properties, in which there is no 
mutual entailment of distinct properties. 
The Sufficiency of Co-extension does not hold for the fine grain theo-
ry. That might be taken as showing that fine grain theories are counter-
intuitive. But instead we might consider that until we stipulate one way 
or the other a theory of properties is ambiguous between a fine grain 
and a coarse grain theory, and that Sufficiency of Co-extension holds 
only for the coarse grain theory. 
One way in which this ambiguity thesis could be correct without 
being ontologically extravagant would be if there is one fundamental 
kind of property and the others are constructed from these in some fash-
ion. For instance, coarse grain properties could be thought of as equiva-
lence classes of fine grain properties under the equivalence relation of 
metaphysically necessary co-extension. Conversely, fine grain properties 
could be thought of as refinements of coarse grain properties. We could, 
for instance, think of the fine grain property as the pair consisting of the 
coarse grain property together with a way of analysing it. For example, 
suppose we distinguish the fine grain properties of triangularity and tri-
laterality, while assuming that, of metaphysical necessity, all and only 
triangles are trilaterals.l1 There is then just the one coarse grain property 
but it can be analysed: (i) as being composed of three lines making a 
closed figure; or (ii) as being composed of lines making a closed figure 
with three angles. 
2. Physicalism as metaphysics 
Eliminative physicalists need not concern themselves with properties 
and possibilities, but non-eliminative physicalists, I take it, believe that 
there are mental properties which are, perhaps in a fallible fashion, 
recognised by introspection in ones own case and spontaneously attrib-
uted to others.12 I shall not attempt a complete classification of versions 
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of non-eliminative physicalism. For it sufficies for my purpose of com-
parison to select two somewhat different but familiar enough versions, 
which I hope are representative. 
A rather weak version of physicalism is the position, introduced as 
far as I know by Davidson, that all truths supervene on the physical. 13 
Call this supervenience physicalism. Here I shall take supervenience to 
mean what Kim has called global supervenience.]' So supervenience 
physicalism amounts to saying that any two possible worlds exactly 
resembling each other in all physical respects exactly resemble each 
other in all respects. To be sure, this thesis has been criticised as too 
weak to capture the pre-theoretic idea of physicalism.15 But it will serve 
my purpose which is to make some comparisons between physicalism 
and classical theism. For strengthening global supervenience will, if 
anything, increase its metaphysical commitments. 
I shall also consider a rather different formulation of non-eliminative 
physicalism, namely reductive physicalism. As I understand it, a truth is 
reduced to those of the physical sciences if it is logically entailed by a 
combination of truths expressible in the physical sciences together with 
appropriate bridging laws. Reductive physicalism, in its initial formula-
tion, is the thesis that all truths are thus reducible. 
The role of bridging laws in a reduction may be illustrated using the 
example of thermodynamics, which we cannot reduce to statistical 
mechanics until, to oversimplify things, we correlate temperature with 
mean kinetic energy. This correlation is the bridging law. Such bridg-
ing laws are not themselves part of the more fundamental theory, in this 
case statistical mechanics. That raises the question: 'Which correlations 
are we entitled to call bridging laws?' If we had no restriction at all then 
we could claim to have reduced XS to Ys whenever the Xs are correlated 
with the Ys. Nor is it sufficient that the correlation be nomologically 
necessary. For if it were, then those attribute dualists who believe there 
are psycho-physical correlation laws would be classified as reductive 
physicalists, which is absurd. Or suppose, as used to be thought, that the 
laws of nature were both deterministic and time-reversible, so that the 
present state of the universe plus the laws specifies both future and past 
states. In that case, if nomological necessity was sufficient for a correla-
tion to count as a bridging law we could reduce the past and future to 
the present, or, even more absurdly, reduce past, present and near 
future all to the state of the universe at some date in the far future. I 
draw the conclusion that bridging laws should hold of a necessity 
stronger than the nomological, and metaphysical necessity is the obvi-
ous candidate. 
If, however, metaphysical necessity were the only constraint on the 
bridging laws, then reductive physicalism would not be much stronger 
than supervenience physicalism. 10 My immediate purpose is to find 
some specimen formulations of physicalism in order to make the com-
parisons with classical theism. For the sake of variety in my specimens, I 
shall, therefore, seek a stronger version of reductive physicalism, based 
on an alternative account of reduction. In the case of thermodynamics 
the bridging laws are type/type (ie property/property) identities. Thus 
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the property of being at, say, lOOoe is identified with the property of 
having such and such mean kinetic energy. That suggests the type/type 
identity theory of such 'old time' physicalists as Smart. I shall interpret 
reductive physicalism in this way, although, in response to the following 
objection, this type/ type identification will be taken as just the first stage 
of a two stage reduction. 
The objection to type/type identification is quite general but may 
conveniently be illustrated using the example of pain. We should resist 
the attempt to identify the property of being in pain with the property of 
having certain brain processes, on the grounds that the same type of 
brain processes might, in a different circumstances, have caused behav-
iour which systematically tended to increase the relevant stimuli, which, 
moreover, were not harmful but beneficial to the organism. If that were 
so for a whole species it would be strange, to say the least, to label it as 
'mad pain' and insist that both in our case and the case of that species 
the brain process in question was pain. '7 In reply to this the physicalist 
might say that pain is a property of the whole nervous system, even the 
whole body, not just of the brain. For this reply to succeed it is crucial 
that the way the muscles are stimulated by spiking frequencies in 
nerves should be included in the property identified with being in pain. 
Otherwise a species for which decreased spiking frequency was respon-
sible for muscle activity would exhibit quite different behaviour while 
still having the property purportedly identified with pain. 
Incorporating all this detail about the motor nerves and muscles into 
the characterisation of the property of being in pain meets my original 
objection but it leaves the type-type identity theorist open to the oppo-
site objection, namely that now there could be cases of pain without all 
these details being as they are with us. In particular there could be a 
species for which the muscles did require a decrease in spiking frequen-
cy of the motor neurones to be stimulated but which had a nervous sys-
tem much like ours except where our motor nerves have increased spik-
ing frequencies theirs have less. It would be counter-intuitive to suggest 
that such animals could not feel pain. 
These, and other, problems should push the reductive physicalist 
towards a reliance on functionalism, namely the characterisation of men-
tal states by means of their functional characteristics. In the context of an 
investigation into the nature of mental properties this amounts to the 
identification of mental with functional properties. For instance, being in 
pain would be identified with the property: instantiating some property 
the instantiation of which typically causes pain behaviour and is typical-
ly causally related to various other mental properties in the appropriate 
ways. As a matter of contingent fact, physicalists then say, the only 
instantiated properties whose instantiation typically causes pain behav-
iour etc are physical properties. 
I consider this to be the best way of overcoming the difficulties with 
reductive physicalism and I draw the conclusion that it requires func-
tionalism, namely the thesis that all mental properties are functional 
ones. 
A corollary, however, of the reliance on functionalism is that there 
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has been a two step not a one step reduction of the psychological to the 
physical. For physicalists are first reducing the psychological to the func-
tional, by identifying properties, and then reducing the functional to the 
physical. The latter reduction is based on the existential form of a func-
tional property, namely: having some property such that X. As a matter 
of contingent fact, physicalists tell us, all the instantiated properties such 
that X are physical ones. 
I have characterised two versions of non-eliminative physicalism. I 
shall now argue for Part (i) of Thesis One by considering them in turn. 
Supervenience physicalism is, I say, based on the concept of metaphysi-
cal necessity. For there is nothing logically inconsistent or inconceivable 
about dualism. So there are conceivable, and logically possible 'worlds' 
in which dualism is correct. Hence if metaphysical necessity were assim-
ilated to logical or conceptual necessity the mental would not supervene 
on the physical. On the other hand, if we assimilated metaphysical to 
nomological necessity then any dualists who allowed that there were 
strict psycho-physical laws correlating mental states with physical 
processes would satisfy the definition of supervenience physicalism, 
which I find absurd. Supervenience physicalists are thus committed to 
the modality of metaphysical necessity. 
Moreover, in order to hold supervenience physicalism, it is not 
enough to accept the modality of metaphysical necessity. An intuition-
transcending theory is required, whereby the range of possibilities is 
restricted. Otherwise the mental need not supervene on the physical 
because it could supervene instead on what Lewis jokingly refers to as 
ghost stuff. Or, more seriously, the mental could supervene on alien pos-
sibilities, that is possibilities unlike anything actual. The reason for this 
is that functional properties may be realised in anything which plays the 
appropriate role and so may be realised in alien possibilities, with suit-
ably complex structureY Supervenience physicalism requires, therefore, 
an intuition-transcending restriction of the range of possible worlds so 
as to exclude alien possibilities. This establishes Part (i) of Thesis One 
for the case of supervenience physicalism. 
I now turn to reductive physicalism. I shall argue that any reductive 
physicalists who insist upon an intuition-bound theory of properties are 
committed to an intuition-transcending theory of possibilities. So in 
some way or other reductive physicalists are committed to intuition-
transcendence. 
Let us consider, then, those reductive physicalists who insist on an 
intuition-bound theory of possibilities. I have interpreted reductive 
physicalism as requiring the identification of mental with functional 
properties. Now there is no logical equivalence between 'feels like that' 
said of pain and the corresponding functional characterisation. In partic-
ular there is no logical incoherence in the idea of trees suffering pain 
when being cut down but having no capacity for any kind of aversive 
behaviour-these are not the ones which grab the chain saw-and so not 
satisfying the functional characterisation of pain. How, then, can mental 
properties be identified with functional ones in the absence of logical 
equivalence? The only relevant intuition here is the Sufficiency of Co-
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extension, which states that no distinct properties can be co-extensive of 
metaphysical necessity. Thus the reductive physicalists whom we are 
considering will insist upon the metaphysical (but not the logical) 
necessity of the co-extension of mental and functional properties. Hence 
the logically possible 'worlds' in which trees feel pain when their limbs 
are sawn off are metaphysically impossible. Such a restriction of the 
metaphysically possible is, I submit, intuition-transcending. 
In reply to this, reductive physicalists might insist that there can be 
no distinct properties which are co-extensive of nomological necessity. 
That would be to reject the possibility of a form of attribute dualism in 
which there is a psycho-physical law perfectly correlating distinct men-
tal and physical properties. While that rejection might have something 
to recommend it, it does not save reductive physicalists from intuition-
transcendence. For there is nothing counter-intuitive about distinct 
properties perfectly correlated of nomological necessity. Indeed quan-
tum physics seems to have provided us with two, related, examples of 
just such perfect correlations, namely: (i) that between having spin 
(intrinsic angular momentum) of magnitude an even times that of an 
electron and being a boson; and (ii) that between having spin of magni-
tude an odd times that of an electron and being a fermion.''! 
I conclude that reductive physicalism requires an intuition-transcend-
ing theory either of properties or of possibilities. This completes my case 
for Part (i) of Thesis One. 
3. Diville non-contingency 
Part (ii) of Thesis One states that, just like supervenience and reduc-
tive physicalists, classical theists should resort to intuition-transcending 
theories of possibilities and/or properties. They need to do so in order 
to defend divine non-contingency, divine transcendence and divine sim-
plicity. I start with divine non-contingency. Here there is a straightfor-
ward comparison with supervenience physicalism. Initially we might 
think there are possible worlds with and without God, just as initially 
we might think there are possible worlds containing humanoids with 
and without non-physical attributes. In both cases we restrict the range 
of possible worlds in ways which are not counter-intuitive so much as 
intuition-transcending. 
Indeed the comparison may be taken further. For theists could, if they 
wished, be supervenience physicalists without considering God to be a 
physical substance. To establish this compatibility between theism and 
supervenience physicalism I require some further speculations, which, 
I invite readers to grant, are jointly coherent. The first is that God can-
not create non-physical things, or things with non-physical properties. 
This is not because of any lack of divine power but because without 
physicality nothing could be distinct from God.20 The second speculation 
is the intuition-transcending thesis that physical things cannot, as 
attribute dualists suggest, have non-physical properties. The third is 
that having created a physical universe of a given kind, God's relations 
with that universe flow from the divine compassion without any further 
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exercise of power. Putting these three speculations together we might 
speculate that all possible worlds are ones in which God creates, if at all, 
one or more physical universes, and that there is no difference between 
such worlds without a physical difference. In particular it is not within 
God's power to have created a universe like this one without acting 
towards it as God has. 21 Such a highly speculative line of thought would 
reconcile supervenience physicalism with belief in a non-physical non-
contingent God. 
Divine non-contingency, then, requires just the sort of intuition tran-
scendence that supervenience physicalism requires. In addition the two 
positions are compatible. Or so I say, but this case for Part (ii) of Thesis 
One would collapse if there is a firm intuition that everything which 
exists, even God, does so contingently. For in that case divine non-con-
tingency would be counter-intuitive rather than merely intuition-tran-
scending.22 
In this context we need to distinguish between merely defeating an 
intuition and dissolving it. Intuitions are, I assume, tendencies to 
believe. (Although not all tendencies to believe are intuitions). I shall say 
that an intuition is merely defeated by some argument if the argument 
provides a reason for resisting that tendency without removing it. I shall 
say that an argument dissolves the intuition if it removes even the ten-
dency to believe. The axioms of naive set theory provide an example: 
many of us find Russell's Paradox disconcerting because the intuitions 
leading to the paradox have not been dissolved, merely defeated. 
Likewise a good argument for a non-contingent God might merely 
exhibit a clash between the intuition that existence is contingent and 
those intuitions on which the argument is based. So even if we consid-
ered the Contingency of Existence defeated, divine non-contingency 
would still be counter-intuitive. By contrast consider an intuitive ten-
dency to believe that if every particle will pass out of existence then 
eventually there will be no particles. This would be dissolved by an 
explanation of the fallacy involved. 
In order to defend divine non-contingency as intuition-transcending 
rather than counter-intuitive, I must dissolve the Contingency of 
Existence, not merely defeat it. The method I shall use, rational decon-
struction, is generally applicable to those intuitions which are the result 
of implicit, unconscious, arguments. (Perhaps all philosopher's intu-
itions are of that sort. I do not know. But at least many of them are.) The 
method of dissolving such intuitions is to uncover the implicit argu-
ments for the supposedly intuitive belief, with the aim of showing that it 
stands or falls with the success of those implicit arguments. Hence if it 
falls, the intuition is not merely defeated but dissolved. 
Let me begin with an implicit argument which Aquinas could have 
explicitly endorsed for complex entities. One reason, I say, why we tend 
to think of existence as contingent is because anything which can cease 
to exist is contingent and anything with structure could cease to exist 
because its components could come to be related differently. We might 
well criticise this argument even for complex things. 23 My point, though, 
is that anyone who grants that it was reliance on some such argument 
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which was supporting the apparently intuitive principle that existence is 
contingent should grant that the intuition would not apply to God if 
God is without the sort of structure which results in the metaphysical 
possibility of disintegration. 
Perhaps the commonest implicit argument, however, derives from 
Kant's rejection of Descartes' version of the ontological argument. It is 
indeed plausible that no true existential statement is analytically non-
contingent. (By which I mean non-contingent due to the way language 
functions. 24 ) The point has been made repeatedly, however, that the-
ists-and atheists-who take God to be non-contingent need not be 
interpreted as taking the existence of God to be analytically non-con tin-
gent.2' 
Opponents of divine non-contingency could reply that their rejec-
tion of the analytic non-contingency of God's existence is not the whole 
of their case but rather serves to focus our attention on what the syn-
thetic non-contingency could be due to. This question is especially 
pressing in the present context because there is a Kantian account of 
such synthetic non-contingency, namely that it is the result of our con-
structing empirical reality in a systematic fashion out of things-in-them-
selves. Some such account could perhaps be adopted by physicalists 
who might take the mental as constructed out of the physical, whether 
or not the physical is identified, in non-Kantian fashion, with the things-
in-themselves. Theists should not, however, take God to be a construct 
and so should not adopt the Kantian account of necessity for the case of 
God. For our concept of God is of something which cannot exist merely 
as a construct.26 
This line of argument against divine non-contingency can, then, be 
construed as a trilemma: either non-contingency is analytic or due to 
our construction or it is mysterious. The existence of God is not non-
contingent in either of the first two ways so it is mysterious, which is a 
reason for rejecting it. 
My response is that there are many non-Kantian ways of explaining 
non-contingency. Interestingly, here there is a parallel not with physi-
calism itself but with a thesis many physicalists hold, namely that the 
laws of nature although metaphysically contingent have their own kind 
of non-contingency which is neither analytic nor capable of Kantian 
explanation.27 Non-contingency could, for instance, be explained in 
terms of time-dependent truth.28 Or it could be explained by means of 
higher order universals. 29 The details are beyond the scope of this 
paper, but my response, in outline, is that Kant discovered just one of 
many explanations of thOSE non-contingencies which are not analytic. 
The case for the parallel between divine non-contingency and super-
venience physicalism depends, then, on the rejection of the principle that 
all existence is contingent. I submit that this principle is one of those 
intuitions which are the result of implicit arguments, and these argu-
ments, once made explicit, are seen to fail, thus dissolving the intuition. 
I hold, then, that divine non-contingency is not counter-intuitive, but, 
merely, as I have been advocating, intuition-transcending. 
PHYSICALISM AND CLASSICAL THEISM 189 
4. Divine transcendence 
Whereas supervenience physicalism provided the comparison with 
divine non-contingency, it turns out that reductive physicalism provides 
the comparison with divine transcendence and divine simplicity. 
By divine transcendence I do not mean the fairly obvious thesis that 
we do not fully comprehend God or the outlandish thesis that we can 
say nothing true of God. Rather I mean that God is not like any other 
thing, or, which J stipulate is to mean the same, God resembles other 
things in no respect. Perhaps some classical theists would want to go 
further and deny that God shares any properties at all with other enti-
ties.30 They could be accommodated by an intuition-transcending restric-
tion of properties to ones which constitute respects of resemblance. (So 
the converse of the Resemblance Principle would hold.) 
Before proceeding I shall make two remarks on which properties 
constitute respects of resemblance. The first is that intuitively negative 
properties do not constitute respects of resemblance. For instance the 
fact that both God and the Ganges have the property of never being 
frozen does not constitute a respect of resemblance. The second is that a 
relational property might constitute a respect of resemblance. For the 
property might be analysed as something having a relation to some 
part or attribute of itself. That two objects, for instance, have a part 
made of gold would constitute a respect in which they resemble each 
other. This leaves us with the following candidates for properties shar-
ing which constitutes a respect of resemblance: those which are intu-
itively positive and are either non-relational or analysed only in terms 
of relations with parts or attributes of the thing itself. I shall call such 
properties intrinsic and the remainder extrinsic. I shall assume, then, 
that all and only intrinsic properties constitute respects of resemblance. 
Hence divine transcendence is the thesis that God shares with other 
beings no intrinsic properties. 1J 
Notice that on the definition I have given such relational properties as 
having-a-daughter are extrinsic. Now there may be those who would 
restrict the extrinsic properties to ones such as being-Alice's-parent, 
where some particular is mentioned. If so they should take my definition 
as stipulative, and intended to give the intuitively correct result about 
resemblance. For I do not regard having a daughter as a respect of 
resemblance. Or, if even this is queried, I would submit that the concept 
of divine transcendence admits an explication in which resemblance is 
restricted to those respects which I have stipulated to be extrinsic. 
One objection to the transcendence of God'2 is that God and created 
things must share the property of having some property. Having some 
property is, however, a necessary condition for resemblance but not, 
strictly speaking, a respect of resemblance. So if we decide it was intrin-
sic we should take it as a counter-example to my claim that all intrinsic 
properties are respects of resemblance, rather than as a counter-example 
to divine transcendence. Instead I say that it is not an intrinsic property, 
for it is analysed as standing in a certain 'relation' namely instantiation 
to some property or other. Either instantiation is not a genuine relation 
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in which case having a property should not itself be a property, or instan-
tiation is a genuine relation in which case having a property is extrinsic. 
Another puzzling case is temporality. Clearly we are temporal 
beings, so if being temporal is an intrinsic property then divine transcen-
dence implies divine eternity. I shall argue, however, that there are two 
distinct ways of being temporal only one of which is the having of an 
intrinsic property of being temporal. A transcendent God may therefore 
be temporal in the other, extrinsic, sense. The intrinsic way of being tem-
poral is being composed of temporal parts or stages some of which are 
later than others. For that, although a relational property, is analysed 
only in terms of relations with parts or attributes of the thing itself. A 
transcendent God cannot, I grant, have temporal parts or stages. But 
there is an extrinsic way in which God can be temporal, namely stand-
ing in temporal relations to created things. That sort of temporality is 
quite compatible with transcendence.33 
I shall now speculate as to how a God without temporal stages might 
nonetheless stand in temporal relations to creation. I begin by consider-
ing the proposal, associated with Godel's solution to the equations of 
general relativity, that time is circular, with the distant future being not 
merely qualitatively but numerically the same as the distant past. 
Against this it could be objected that no event is earlier than itself but 
being earlier than is transitive. From these two premisses we may infer 
that there is no cycle of events, El, ... , En such that El is earlier than E2, 
E2 is earlier than E3 etc, but En is in its turn earlier than El. But such a 
cycle would occur if time was circular. The obvious reply to this is that if 
time were circular then the temporal ordering would not be transitive 
but only locally transitive. An analog is the relation of being-West-of. If 
we ignore regions near the Poles then being-West-of is locally transitive, 
but it is not transitive without qualification. Now I do not believe time 
is circular in the way that Godel's solution suggests. But that example 
and the analogy with being-West-of enables me to speculate that God, 
without any division into temporal stages, stands in two temporal rela-
tions to creation. As the I Alpha' God is earlier than all else; as the 
'Omega', God is later than everything else. And that can hold even if 
the everything else consists of events without end. 34 
I now turn to a more serious objection to divine transcendence. Those 
who endorse it nonetheless attribute to God various quite determinate 
psychological characteristics which can also be attributed to human 
beings. Initially these would seem to correspond to intrinsic properties. 
Thus God is almost always said to be wise and loving, and sometimes 
said to have aesthetic sensibilities and a sense of humour. Does it not fol-
low, then, that God and human beings share various psychological 
properties? Now there are a number of accounts on which it is denied 
that these things are predicated univocally of God and human beings, 
but discussing these accounts is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, I 
am interested in defending the transcendence of God without undermin-
ing the univocity of what is said of God and human beings. 
One way out of this difficulty is to follow Alston35 and identify these 
determinate psychological properties with functional ones, where the 
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functional roles are performed in one way in human beings and in 
another in God. Thus by identifying determinate psychological proper-
ties with functional ones we can explain how various predicates are 
applied univocally to God and to human beings even though the only 
shared properties are extrinsic ones. For example, loving-kindness 
might be identified with the functional property of having some prop-
erty (the grounding property) the having of which spontaneously results 
in what is good for others regardless of their deserts. (Or if that is too 
crude, T ask readers to fill in the details.) In that case loving kindness is 
indeed shared by God and most human beings, provided we read 'oth-
ers' as 'some others' not 'all others'. It is, however, extrinsic, while the 
grounding property in virtue of which God has loving kindness, which 
may well be intrinsic, is not shared with any human beings. 
In further support of this Alstonian account T note that the grounding 
property in virtue of which some human beings are full of loving kind-
ness is probably either wholly or in part a complex structural property of 
their brains. Clearly God does not share such a property with any of us. 
There are, however, some divine attributes, notably self-knowledge 
and self-love, which cannot shown to be extrinsic in quite this way. For, 
in both the human and divine case, self-knowledge and self-love are 
analysed in terms of relations with (parts or attributes of) the one who 
has the property in question. What shall we say of these? Here we need 
to characterise the relations of knowing or loving functionally, namely 
as being related by a relation (the grounding relation) the holding of 
which typically has certain specified results. Having characterised the 
relations of loving or knowing functionally we do not then need a direct 
functional characterisation of the special reflexive cases of self-love and 
self-knowledge. And we may now say that the grounding relations in 
virtue of which God knows or loves are different from those for human 
beings. 
The crucial point that many psychological properties are extrinsic can 
be re-stated using the broad/narrow psychology distinction. A broad 
psychological property is one which is an extrinsic property of the per-
son's mind, and a narrow psychological property is one which is intrin-
sic to the mind. There has been persuasive argument that many psycho-
logical properties are indeed broad. Thus Putnam argues for the broad 
status of even such prima facie narrow states as belief.36 Without deny-
ing that there are some interesting narrow psychological properties, 
such as the desire that feeling thirsty cease, this emphasis on the broad 
character of many determinate psychological properties supports the 
thesis that all the psychological properties any creature shares with God 
are extrinsic ones. Thus we are able to defend divine transcendence, and 
in a way which provides evidence for Thesis Three. 
The most serious objection to divine transcendence, however, is pro-
vided not by any determinate psychological property but by conscious-
ness itself, which is, it would seem, shared by God, we ourselves and, 
presumably, at least some animals; but is not shared by rocks, plants 
and philosophers' zombies. Here supervenience physicalism is of little 
comfort to classical theists, for the property of consciousness might well 
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be a supervenient one. Reductive physicalists, however, share the prob-
lem of consciousness with classical theists. For just as it threatens to be 
an intrinsic property shared by God and us, violating divine transcen-
dence, it also threatens to be a non-physical property. Consciousness 
presents much the same problem, then, for reductive physicalists and 
classical theists, a problem to which I shall return. 
Divine transcendence, then, may be defended by resort to the combi-
nation of functionalism with some response to the problem of conscious-
ness. This provides support for Theses Two and Three. 
5. Divine simplicity 
I now turn to the perplexing thesis, quite central to classical theism, 
that God is simple. Initially we might characterise this as the thesis that 
in God there is a distinction neither of parts nor of properties. A simple 
entity might, however, stand in one or more relations to other entities. 
We should allow, therefore, a multiplicity of properties provided these 
are analysed in terms of relations with other entities. And clearly, if 
there are negative properties then God has many of them. Divine sim-
plicity should be reformulated, therefore, as the thesis that in God there 
is neither a multiplicity of parts not a multiplicity of intrinsic properties. 
The mention of parts might well be redundant, for we may be guided by 
the intuition that every mereologically complex thing would have the 
intrinsic property of having at least two parts. In any case, because clas-
sical theists deny that God is spatially extended, they can easily take any 
prima facie parts of God (eg the three persons of the orthodox doctrine 
of the Trinity) as prima facie cases of a multiplicity of properties.37 I shall 
therefore concentrate on divine simplicity as excluding a multiplicity of 
intrinsic properties. 
Many classical theists such as Aquinas would go further and deny 
that in God there are even such categorial distinctions as that between 
substance and property.38 This denial of categorial structure could be 
taken to imply that God is not a thing and so not the sort of thing to 
have properties. I myself have considerable sympathy with this position, 
which might seem, however, to trivialise the discussion of whether God 
has a multiplicity of properties. To avoid trivialisations, I allow an 
instrumentalist attitude towards ontology: it is as if God is a substance 
and has at least one property, divinity. The question can then be raised 
within the scope of this 'as if' whether there is any multiplicity of intrin-
sic properties. 
God has intuitively distinct properties such as self-love and self-
knowledge. I have, however, already argued that these are to be treated 
as the reflexive case of relations which are functionally characterised 
and so extrinsic. To be sure the grounding relations for (divine) love and 
knowledge are intrinsic. But it is not so much counter-intuitive as intu-
ition-transcending to identify these two relations. (So we have another 
illustration of Thesis One.) 
The chief problem with divine simplicity does not, then, arise from 
the identification of 'intuitively distinct' intri: [sic properties, which are 
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typically the unknown groundings of familiar enough functional prop-
erties." The chief problem as I see it is this: How could a God without 
any multiplicity of intrinsic properties exhibit psychological complexity? 
As in the case of divine transcendence, functionalism solves this prob-
lem by motivating the claim that the many distinct mental properties we 
share with God are extrinsic ones. Provided the one underlying state has 
many effects it can play many functional roles. Hence in the divine case 
there need only be the one grounding property. 
An objection to this way of reconciling ontological simplicity with 
psychological complexity is that the extrinsic (broad) psychological 
properties, partly characterised by relations with items in our environ-
ment, are correlated with intrinsic (narrow) ones, which are the objects 
of introspection. For example even if, as Putnam has argued. the desire 
for a glass of water is extrinsic, the desire that thirst cease would seem to 
be intrinsic. Likewise, the multiplicity of extrinsic psychological proper-
ties shared by God and human beings must, the objection goes, reflect a 
multiplicity of narrow psychological properties in God, even if these are 
quite unlike the narrow psychological properties we humans have. 
To the extent that we are merely extrapolating from the human case 
this objection is somewhat irrelevant, for it is already acknowledged that 
God is unlike a human being. There are, however, a couple of arguments 
behind the intuition that broad psychological properties depend on nar-
row ones. One of them is that we would not call a functional property a 
psychological or mental one unless it had an introspectible component.'" 
Otherwise every refrigerator could literally feel comfortably cool or 
uncomfortably hot. Another argument is that for any broad psychologi-
cal property there is the possibility of an introspectively indistinguishable 
narrow one occurring in an hallucinatory, or otherwise non-veridical, 
fashion. If one or both of these arguments is persuasive then we must 
grant that a being with no multiplicity of intrinsic properties must lack 
psychological complexity. And I think it is precisely here that the sim-
plicity of God has seemed so absurd to many. A simple God would seem 
to be one whose mental state was bare consciousness like Brahman is 
often taken to be. And how could we call such a God personal? 
I shall reply to these two arguments in turn. First, there is no need to 
posit distinct narrow states as the introspectible component of distinct 
broad states. So the one divine narrow mental state could be the intro-
spectible component of all the many divine broad mental states. And the 
reason why there is no need to posit distinct narrow states is that the 
broad ones are characterised functionally and one item can perform 
many functions. To take a low technology example, a piece of steel of a 
certain characteristic shape, which I call a wrecking bar, is apt for: 
removing nails; prising beams apart; moving heavy stones; keeping 
over-enthusiastic guard dogs at bay; etc. 
Concerning the positing of narrow properties introspectively indis-
tinguishable from the broad ones: these are posited precisely because of 
the possibility of such non-veridical mental states as beliefs with false 
existential presuppositions, hallucinatory sensations and so on. There is 
no need to posit them in the case of God. 
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My reply leads, however, to a further problem. For if the richness of 
the divine mental life derives from a multiplicity of extrinsic properties, 
then, it could be objected, except for creation the divine mental life would 
be impoverished. For what extrinsic properties could God have except 
for creation? One response to this is to allow a Platonic realm of abstract 
entities, possibilia etc which exist independently of God. Relations with 
these might well provide the extrinsic properties required for a rich 
divine psychological life. But the existence of such a Platonic realm even 
prior to creation might seem to conflict with the combination of divine 
simplicity and the aseity thesis itself.41 For if the abstract entities depend 
on God without being created, should not they be parts or attributes of 
God? I shall treat this as a problem with aseity rather than simplicity. 
For the moment I simply record that, if we ignore aseity, divine simplici-
ty can be defended using a combination of the intuition-transcending 
identification of various intrinsic properties, with a functionalist account 
of those psychological properties shared with us. This supports Thesis 
Two. 
6. Consciousness re-examined, and the aseity thesis 
The final topic on the list is the aseity thesis, but before I consider the 
problem it raises I shall re-open the question of consciousness. Consider 
the imitation person whose brain processes play all the functional roles 
of ours, including those for pain, but feels nothingY Such an imitation 
person is functionally indistinguishable from one of us but is nonethe-
less a fake, lacking consciousness. 'Not metaphysically possible!' physi-
calists can reply, or 'There is no property of being conscious'. 
Nonetheless there is enormous intuitive appeal in the thought experi-
ment. It draws our attention to an astounding fact about ourselves 
which distinguishes us from the way we normally imagine rocks and 
plants to be. And unless we resort to the rather drastic expedient of 
panpsychism, surely being conscious is something which adds to the 
resemblance of things, like us, which are conscious.<3 So if we grant the 
Resemblance Principle as a property-theoretic intuition then the denial 
that consciousness is a property would not merely be intuition-tran-
scending, but, it would seem, counter-intuitive.'" Consciousness would 
then be a property. Furthermore, if it is a property then it is an intrinsic 
one, for surely that we are conscious is a respect in which we resemble 
each other but do not resemble the imitation person. 
Admitting a property of consciousness is quite compatible with 
supervenience physicalism-it is a supervenient property provided 
there is no metaphysical possibility of an imitation person. But it is a 
serious difficulty for reductive physicalists, for, we have supposed, the 
imitation person is functionally indistinguishable from us. Hence the 
attempted functionalist characterisation of consciousness will result in 
the characterisation of a property which I shall call proto-consciousness 
which is, at best, coextensive with consciousness of metaphysical neces-
sity, but not identical to it. We have, then, a further point of comparison 
between, in this case, reductive physicalism and divine simplicity, 
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namely Thesis Three which tells us that they have a shared problem 
with consciousness. 
My solution to this problem is to adopt Thesis Four: reductive physi-
calists should allow both fine and coarse grain properties. We can insist 
that our property-theoretic intuitions are a mixture of ones appropriate 
for the two different theories. We are then able to say that for the pur-
poses of formulating reductive physicalism we need a coarse grain theo-
ry, in which consciousness and proto-consciousness are identified, but 
that reflections on imitation persons alert us to various fine grain prop-
erties. 
Whether or not physicalists resort to having both finer and coarser 
grain theories of properties I shall now argue that there are good reasons 
why classical theists should. This is because of the problem with the ase-
ity thesis, which states that everything other than God depends on God. 
The problem with aseity does not concern the dependence of contingent 
things. For these, theists traditionally believe, were created by God. No 
the problem comes with the necessary beings, namely the Platonic realm 
of properties and possibilities, and other abstract entities. For unless 
God is aware of the possibilities prior to creation then it is totally myste-
rious as to how God could create wisely and well. The obvious solution 
to this problem is to assert that for God a nominalist or conceptualist 
theory of the Platonic realm would be correct and that there is nothing 
more to unactualised possibilities and uninstantiated properties than the 
divine knowledge of what is possible. 
That nominalist solution implies that the divine knowledge of possi-
bilities is an intrinsic property, which leads to a further problem. For 
now we seem to have two distinct intrinsic divine properties, the knowl-
edge of possibilities and self-knowledge. One response by classical theists 
is to insist that once again we are mistaking the intuition-transcending 
for the counter-intuitive. We may transcend our intuitions by treating the 
divine knowledge of possibilities as the very same property as the divine 
self knowledge, perhaps because, in some way, the possibilities reflect 
the nature of God. But this leads to yet another problem. For then there 
is no distinction between God's knowing this possibility and God's 
knowing that possibility, and hence no explanation of why God chooses 
this rather than that. At very least it would seem that God must know the 
possible worlds as distinct in order to create some but not others. 
I shall not, therefore, rely on the nominalist solution. Instead I pro-
pose reliance upon a fine grained theory of properties when stating the 
aseity thesis but a coarse grain theory when considering divine simplici-
ty and transcendence. Thus we can explain how God chooses to create 
this rather than that by noting that there are distinct fine grain properties 
corresponding to these items of knowledge, even though they corre-
spond to the very same coarse grain property. And, as I have already 
indicated, an analogous move could be made by physicalists in order to 
defend physicalism from the problem of consciousness. This supports 
Thesis Four. 
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7. Deflation 
Physicalists are faced with the problem of consciousness, classical theists 
with the problem of the abstract entities. One response which both can 
make is to distinguish a fine from a coarse grain theory. There are obviously 
deflationary but also apparently non deflationary ways of interpreting this. 
The apparently non-deflationary interpretation is to insist that the most fun-
damental properties are indeed the coarse ones, and so some strong theses 
(notably the physicalists' denial of non-physical properties and the classi-
cal theists' denial of any distinction between the divine intrinsic properties) 
are true if we take the concept of a property in its more fundamental sense. 
It is then granted that a fine grain theory of properties can be derived from 
the coarse grain theory by considering, say, different analyses. For example, 
the grounding for self-knowledge would be the same coarse grain property 
as the grounding for knowledge of possibilities, but analysed in different 
ways just as in my earlier example of triangularity and trilaterality. 
The obviously deflationary account is the other way round. On it the 
fundamental properties are the fine grain ones and we construct coarse 
grade properties from them by identifying properties which are meta-
physically mutually entailing. Given that way of looking at it, divine sim-
plicity, for instance, would amount to no more than saying that the 
divine properties are co-extensive of metaphysical necessity. And reduc-
tive physicalism would, for the special case of consciousness, amount to 
no more than supervenience physicalism: of metaphysical necessity there 
are no imitation persons. 
There is, however, a problem with the non-deflationary account when 
it comes to divine simplicity. I find it hard to envisage how we can refine 
coarse properties which were themselves simple, that is ones which lack 
both any multiplicity of intrinsic properties (which would then be prop-
erties of properties) and any structure or composition out of other prop-
erties. Hence it would seem that we save the astounding doctrine of the 
simplicity of God only by positing a single intrinsic divine property, call 
it divinity, which it itself complex. We have merely shifted the complexi-
ty up from the particular to its unique intrinsic property. And that is 
itself a deflationary move. 
Conclusion 
I conclude that non-eliminative physicalism, especially reductive 
physicalism is up to its neck in metaphysics and in much the same way 
as classical theism. Both need to resort to intuition-transcending theories 
of metaphysical possibility and/or properties, and both, I say, need to 
resort to a distinction between finer and coarser grain properties. In addi-
tion to these metaphysical similarities, reductive physicalism and classi-
cal theism are similar in their philosophical psychologies. Both require 
care when it comes to the property of consciousness and, more generally, 
both need to be supported by functionalism. 
University of New England 
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NOTES 
* Versions of this paper were read to seminars at the University of 
New England in August 1994, and the Australian National University in 
October 1994. 1 would like to thank all who contributed to the discussion on 
those occasion. I would also like to thank both Barry Miller and the anony-
mous referee for their helpful comments. 
1. If God is simple and if God has at least one property essentially, then 
God does not change. I fail to see, however, how this implies that God is 
eternal in the sense of being a non-temporal being. To be sure, contempo-
rary Tarmenideans' hold that any temporal being has temporal parts in 
which case simplicity directly implies eternity, but that argument depend 
more on the philosophy of time than on philosophical theology. 
2. See Alvin Plantinga, Does God have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1980), pp. 54-55. The part of sovereignty-aseity I am not 
endorsing is that everything is within God's control. God might have relin-
quished control on certain matters; or abstract entities, while dependent on 
God, might not be within God's control. 
3. This is stronger than saying that God and God only is a se. For that 
would hold if God was a se, but some other things belong to an infinite 
regress of dependence relations without depending on God. 
4. By an identification of X and Y I mean the theoretical claim that X is 
the very same as Y. 
5. Or, equivalently, the intuition is that proper names are rigid designa-
tors. 
6. Theodore Guleserian, 'God and Possible Worlds: The Modal Problem 
of Evil', NOils 17 (1983) pp. 221-238. 
7. See, for instance, Laura L. Garcia, 'A response to the Modal Problem 
of Evil', Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984), pp. 378-388, especially the remarks on 
intuitions on p. 384. 
8. See D. M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific 
Realism, Volume n (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Ch 15, 
for a clear commitment to the Conjunction Principle. 
9. 1£ it is denied that properties are universals then we should say that a 
property is 'shared' by two particulars just in case they have exactly resem-
bling properties. 
10. Bealer calls the coarse grade qualities, the fine grade concepts. See 
George Bealer, Quality and Concept (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), Ch 8. 
11. This example stands in for a more complicated one that r find more 
persuasive. Characterise trilaterality as: being made up of the line segments 
AB, BC and CA for three distinct points A, Band C . Now characterise being 
a Jordan curve as: being the continuous one to one image of a circle. 
Assuming the properties of space are essential, then of necessity trilaterality 
is co-extensive with the conjunction of trilaterality and being a Jordan curve. 
The analog for quadrilaterality does not hold. (Consider the figure made up 
of AB, BD, DC, and CA, where ABCD is a square. That figure is not a Jordan 
curve, for Jordan curves do not intersect themselves.) That there is no such 
coextension in the case of quadrilaterality, supports the claim that even in 
the case of trilaterality we have two distinct properties. 
12. Spontaneous beliefs in the mental states of others are, presumably, 
grounded in, without being consciously justified by, the perception of what 
is physical, especially behaviour. 
13. Donald Davidson 'Mental Events' in Essays on Actions and Events 
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
14. Jaegwon Kim, 'Concepts of Supervenience', Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 45 (1984) pp. 153-76. 
15. In response to such criticism Horgan has recently proposed regional 
supervenience, which is that no regions of any possible world can be qualita-
tively identical in all physical respects without being qualitatively identical 
in all respects. See Terence Horgan, 'From Supervenience to 
Superdupervenience', Mind, 102 (1993), pp. 555-586. There is, however, a 
position to which the referee has drawn my attention, that of a substance 
dualist who considers the mental to supervene on the physical. That is, there 
could be no two possible worlds with the very same physical substances 
and the very same allocation of physical properties to those substances, but 
with different mental substances or a different allocation of mental proper-
ties to mental substances. As far as I can see that position would satisfy 
Horgan's regional supervenience, but some might deny that it counts as 
physicalism of any sort. For my purposes I shall stipulate that it does. 
16. The most notable case of a non-reductive supervenience physicalism 
is Davidson's anomalous monism. It fails to be reductive because there are 
no psycho-physical correlations. 
17. See David Lewis, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', in Philosophical 
Papers, Vol I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). Abnormal 
'Martians' might be in mad pain, but not all Martians could be. 
18. For that reason Lewis, who seems reluctant to restrict the range of 
possibilities, has characterised a position called minimal materialism, which 
is weaker than supervenience physicalism. According to it, the mental 
supervenes on the physical only in a weaker sense of 'supervenes' based on 
a restriction of possibility to those possible worlds not containing alien nat-
ural properties. See David Lewis, 'New work for a Theory of Universals', 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983), pp. 343-77. The formulation of 
minimal materialism is on p.364. 
19. 50sons and fermions are characterised by their statistical behaviour. 
In particular fermions unlike bosons are, in a suitably qualified sense, 
unable to occupy exactly the same state. 
20. This is an extension of Aquinas' thesis that there can be no multi-
plicity of things of a given kind unless they differ in their matter. 
21. I have refrained from speculating that God does have that power but 
is necessarily good and so necessarily does not exercise it. If the only pro-
hibition on imitation persons is the necessity of divine goodness then we 
have not, I submit, captured the full force of the physicalist's rejection of 
imitation persons. Theists should, therefore, modify the definition of super-
venience physicalism by considering not the possible worlds but the larger 
class of those worlds x such that God has the power to do something which 
if it were done would establish the possibility of x. 
22. As Daniel Nolan pointed out to me, a similar case cannot be made for 
the counter-intuitive character of the claim that God necessarily does not 
exist. 
23. Perhaps along the lines of Plantinga's criticisms of the argument 
from divine aseity to divine simplicity. (Does God have a Nature? pp. 28-38.) 
24. Note that a Kripkean necessity of identity while not analytic could be 
analysed as the conjunction of an existential claim and an analytic non-con-
tingency claim. If that is correct, then it is true in virtue of the way lan-
guage functions that if Hesperus is Phosphorus then necessarily Hesperus 
is Phosphorus. 
25. See for instance Thomas V. Morris, 'Necessary Beings', Mind, 94 
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(1985), pp. 263-72. Morris clearly distinguishes consistency from broad logi-
cal possibility. My terminology is different, but roughly speaking metaphys-
ical possibility is the same as Morris' broad logical possibility, and my ana-
lytic contingency corresponds to the consistency of both the proposition and 
its negation. I would endorse Morris' examples of the Axiom of Choice and 
the Continuum Hypothesis as propositions which are non-contingent in a 
non-analytic fashion. 
26. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant in fact held that God is an 'ideal of 
pure reason', and as such not a construct so much as an indispensable fic-
tion. The contemporary theologian Cupitt has, however, proposed that God 
is indeed a construct. See, for instance, Cupitt, Don, The Sea of Faith 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
27. I take it that the Kantian account of the laws of nature as imposed or 
constructed by the knowing mind has been dealt serious blows by the 
replacement of classical mechanics with general relativity and quantum 
mechanics. Concerning these theories I borrow Tertullian's epigram 'I 
believe because it is impossible', interpreting this to mean: the surprising 
character of these theories, which nonetheless help us understand the world, 
is evidence that they are not mere human inventions or constructions but 
genuine discoveries. 
28. The idea is that what is necessary at a given time is that which is true 
at that time, and that time-independent necessity is that which has always 
been true. For the details, see Forrest, Peter, 'Physical necessity and the pas-
sage of time' in Riggs, P. J. (ed.) Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific 
Methodology, Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). 
29. As on the Dretske Tooley Armstrong theory of laws of nature as a 
relation between universals. See Armstrong D. M. What is a Law of Nature? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). That theory seems to 
assume that facts about properties themselves instantiating (higher order) 
relations are necessary. One theistic parallel to this is to submit that divinity, 
if there is such a property, is self-instantiated, in which case whether or not 
there is such a property is not contingent. 
30. As in footnote 9, if it is denied that properties are universals then 
'shares any properties' has to be suitably paraphrased. 
31. If God is not simple, then, for the purpose of this definition, I stipu-
late that divine parts or attributes are not 'other beings'. 
32. Put to me by William McDonald. 
33. The thesis that God is temporal only in the extrinsic fashion is open 
to many of the prima facie objections to the divine eternity. For a recent 
reply to those prima facie objections see Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann, 'Eternity, Awareness and Action', Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), 
pp. 463-482. 
34. To press the analogy with circular time, let us suppose that God 
occupies one point on a circle, and that the history of the universe com-
prises an open semicircular arc consisting of just those points strictly more 
than 90° away from God on the circle. We may then correlate points on that 
arc with the whole of time as we know it, by representing time as we know 
it by points on the tangent to the circle at the point diametrically opposite 
God. Lines through the center of the circle intersect both the semicircular arc 
and the tangent just once, setting up the one to one correlation. The circle 
has two directions (earlier to later and later to earlier) even though these 
directions do not correspond to transitive later than and earlier than rela-
tions. 
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35. William Alston 'Functionalism and Theological Language', 
Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985), pp. 221-230. 
36. On Twin Earth the stuff which is phenomenally indistinguishable 
from water is not water because it is XYZ not H20. Putnam suggests that 
the inhabitants of Twin Earth do not express the same belief as we do when 
they say that lakes are filled with water, for by 'water' they mean that stuff 
(which is in fact XYZ) not this stuff (which is in fact H20). Nonetheless they 
could have the same narrow psychological property, for there could be the 
same patterns of spiking frequencies in their brains as in ours and the same 
attendant qualia, if any. See Hilary Putnam, 'The meaning of "meaning" , in 
K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol 7: 
Language, Mind and Knowledge, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1975). 
37. Thus a person in the relevant sense might well be taken as an 
attribute of the divine substance. (A person, whether human or divine, 
would still be a substance in the weak sense of that which can instantiate 
properties and relations even though not in the strong sense of that which is 
not itself instantiated. In our case our bodies instantiantiate us.) Hence the 
three persons are a prima facie threat to the identity of the divine properties. 
Let me also note that the idea of a person as a (functionally characterised) 
attribute, rather than a substance in the strong sense, coheres well with 
physicalism. But that further point of comparison is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
38. Part of the simplicity thesis which Plantinga is criticising in Does God 
have a Nature? is the identity of God with the divine nature. 
39. Nor, since we are assuming divine transcendence is there the prob-
lem of how properties distinct in us could be the same in God. 
40. To allow for sub-conscious states we should interpret 'introspectible' 
to mean 'of the same kind as ones which are introspected'. 
41. I have not, note, assumed the sovereignty-aseity intuition. See Does 
God have a Nature? pp. 34-7 for Plantinga's statement of the problem of rec-
onciling that intuition with the existence of abstract entities. 
42. Campbell, Keith, Body and Mind, (2nd edition) (London: Macmillan, 
1970), pp.100-01. 
43. Nagel has defended panpsychism but it has not found favour with 
physicalists. (See Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions [Cambridge: Cambridge 
Liniversity Press, 1979], ch 13.) 
44. A way of avoiding this conclusion is to treat X's being conscious as a 
matter of X's being aware of something. We may then adopt a Humean No 
Self theory in which X's being aware of Y is just a matter of (i) Y's appearing 
and (ii) Y's appearing being a constituent of X. In place, therefore, of the 
property of consciousness we have the property of appearing. In place of the 
imitation person thought experiment we have the thought experiment of a 
world like this one except that nothing appears. The resulting issues are 
much the same. So even though I favour this approach it is not worth inde-
pendent discussion. 
